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Abstract 
 
This paper addresses the social problem of child 
pornography on peer-to-peer (P2P) networks on the 
Internet and presents an automated system with effective 
computer and telematic tools for seeking out and 
identifying data exchanges with pedophilic content on the 
Internet. The paper analyzes the social and legal context 
in which the system must operate and describes the 
processes by which the system respects the rights of the 
persons investigated and prevents these tools from being 
used to establish processes of surveillance and attacks on 
the privacy of Internet users. 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, Internet has undergone considerable 
growth both in the number of people accessing the 
services it offers and the volume of information being 
exchanged, in addition to the speed of data transfers and 
the geographic areas from which one can access Internet. 
This growth has meant that interpersonal activities or 
citizens’ relationships with other social actors – which 
were performed until recently with conventional 
communications methods, often in person – are now 
increasingly being conducted on the Internet or through 
other computer networks.  
These new technological opportunities, with their 
extremely powerful tools for communication between 
Internet users, offer considerable advantages but also pose 
certain risks that must be addressed. Thus, we are seeing 
changes that are both swift and far-reaching in the 
behavior of social actors. However, we often lack either 
ethical or moral standards on what is licit and what is 
illicit, or legal regulations to adapt laws to new situations 
and specify certain actions as unlawful. 
In some cases, even though both law and social 
consensus exist on the propriety of punishing certain 
criminal acts, the obstacles posed by the multi-national 
nature of the Internet make effective prosecution of crime 
extremely difficult. One example of this is bank robberies 
in which the theft of the money is carried out in Spain, but 
the thief is in a faraway country. In such cases, the 
differences between legal systems, disagreements between 
states and differences between policing bodies make it 
quite difficult to carry out effective action against the 
commission of this sort of crime. 
In cases that lack pre-established ethical and moral 
standards, debates arise in society on the advisability of 
different restrictions when initiatives arise to condition 
and legally regulate certain exchanges on the Internet 
(music, films, literary texts, etc). The controversy occurs 
because these cases involve conflicts between different 
previously established civic rights in democratic societies, 
such as intellectual property, freedom of speech and 
privacy of communications, among others. Depending 
upon which of these rights is considered a priority, often 
irreconcilable conflicts emerge between different actors in 
society. 
Unfortunately, there has been a substantial increase in 
the number of files being shared by members of peer to 
peer (P2P) networks containing child pornography [1]. 
Perhaps owing to the execrable nature of this behavior, we 
have found no societal debate on the advisability of police 
prosecution, elimination of pedophilic contents from the 
Internet and punishment for the guilty. Behind every 
picture or video with pedophilic content is a child who is 
being exploited and abused by unscrupulous people. 
According to the information available, it would seem that 
the police of different countries – who are quite hesitant in 
other cases – are quite willing to collaborate and share 
information in persecuting pedophiles [2].  
Given this context, the authors of this paper, along with 
other members of a multidisciplinary research team, are 
participating in a joint project between the Polytechnic 
University of Madrid and the Spanish police aimed at 
developing a system with the computer and telematic tools 
needed to seek out and identify exchanges of data with 
pedophilic content, with a view to obtaining evidence that 
can be used by judges in formulating legal rulings. 
Regardless of how repugnant and reprehensible 
pedophilic conduct may be, the law requires that any such 
system establishes safeguards to ensure respect for the 
presumption of innocence for all people who 
communicate on the Internet, and respect for the rights of 
the persons being investigated as well as to prevent this 
tool from being used to perpetrate processes of 
surveillance and attacks on the privacy of the immense 
majority of users of P2P networks exchanging lawful data. 
Thus, as described below, individuals managing the 
system, including persons with the status of 
administrators, may not engage in certain actions without 
the express permission – in the form of information pieces 
secured with robust cryptography – of persons authorized 
to grant such permission, presumably the judge in charge 
of the investigation. 
The following section of this paper deals with the 
social and legal context in which the tool is to operate, 
and this shall be entirely separate from issues of technical 
feasibility. As a system conceived to be managed by 
Spanish police and judges, the discussion of legal and 
political conditions will center mainly on the situation in 
Spain and the European Union. Nevertheless, analysis is 
provided of the fact that much of the information in 
question comes from countries in which Spanish police 
can not act. In the event the tool should prove useful in 
another state, the legal context in which it would operate 
must first be subject to analysis. 
Section 3, in contrast, is eminently technical in nature 
and describes in highly generic fashion the main features 
of the system in which the computer and telematic tools 
operate in searching for and identifying pedophilic 
contents in P2P networks. Because the system has a high 
degree of technical complexity, the description provided 
in section 3 takes a necessarily generic and summary 
form. Thus, its technical descriptions are comprehensible 
to readers lacking specialized knowledge of computing 
and communications. Section 4 offers a summary 
discussion on the performance of the tool with regard to 
respect for the rights of individuals to be investigated, and 
section 5 presents some conclusions. 
 
2. Social and legal context 
 
2.1. Overview 
 
The emergence of Internet, along with other 
technological advances, has precipitated a huge leap in the 
volume and nature of child pornography available. 
Internet acts not only as mechanism for creating, 
displaying, exhibiting, commercializing or distributing 
child pornography, but also as vehicle for pedophiles to 
make contact with new victims and deceive them. Internet 
has brought a revolution in the methods of access, 
operation and dissemination [3].  
The typological of criminal activities on the Internet 
[4] is quite wide: swindles, crimes against intellectual and 
industrial property, damage to computers – viruses and so 
on – crimes against privacy, disclosure of business 
secretes, telecommunications fraud – phreaking and 
wardriving – among others [5]. This paper presents some 
of the main features of a research project being conducted 
jointly by the Polytechnic University of Madrid and the 
Spanish police, having chosen prosecution of the crime of 
distributing child pornography through P2P networks 
because this practice has generated some of the highest 
levels of alarm in society and it most seriously affects the 
dignity of minors.  
This crime is addressed in article 189 of the Spanish 
Penal Code. It penalizes the use of minors in pornographic 
spectacles, the distribution or commercialization of child 
pornography material and the personal use of said 
material. 
At this time, the Spanish Ombudsman has proposed the 
inclusion of two further types of conduct in the wording of 
the Penal Code: simply viewing child pornography 
without storing or distributing it and attendance at 
spectacles of child pornography.   
First of all, the Convention on Children’s Rights 
recommends defining as a crime access to child 
pornography through information and communications 
technologies: that is, conduct consisting of the simple 
viewing of child pornography without storing or 
distributing it. In short, the idea is to provide a penal 
reaction against the “potential stimulus of sexual 
exploitation of children this conduct implies” (in this 
regard, the proposed decision-making framework of the 
Council of the European Union on combating the sexual 
exploitation of children and child pornography, 
2001/0025). As stated in Query 3/2006 of the State 
Attorney of Spain, lawmakers sought to protect the sexual 
indemnity of minors by setting up penal protections. In 
accordance with this argument, it is understood that 
Spanish Penal Code, just as it penalizes the mere 
possession of child pornography, should contain 
provisions that punish the mere access to child 
pornography on the Internet. 
In like manner, the Council of Europe agreement 
recommends, while allowing for the possible presentation 
of reserves on this point, punishment as a criminal offence 
the knowing attendance at pornographic spectacles in 
which minors participate. On this point, the Spanish Penal 
Code penalizes, among other forms of conduct, the 
financing of exhibitionist or pornographic spectacles in 
which minors are used but, in a manner that is similar to 
the consumption child prostitution, the mere attendance as 
a spectator at such displays is not expressly and 
specifically penalized. In view of the seriousness of the 
current problem and the alarm it has aroused, it would 
seem appropriate for Spanish law to classify as a knowing 
attendance of spectacles of child pornography as a 
criminal offence. When placing such conduct in the 
context of Internet, it would seem reasonable to believe 
that the mere conscious viewing of pedophilic contents 
constitutes an improper and morally reprehensible act that 
could also be considered criminal; although, if they were 
classified as such, the nature of the Internet would make it 
highly difficult to obtain proof of an offence. Hence the 
importance of persecuting the production and distribution 
of pedophilic contents. 
The table below contains the texts of laws now in force 
domestically in Spain, in the EU and internationally. We 
might say that minors enjoy a sufficient degree of 
protection in the exercise or enforcement of their rights.  
 
Table 1. Related spanish legislation 
DOMESTIC LAW 
Law for the legal protection of minors 
Penal Code (art. 189) and the Law on Criminal Justice  
Law on Information Society Services 
 
 
Table 2. Related international legislation 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 
Optional protocol on the sale of children, child 
prostitution and child pornography 
Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of 
information society services.  
Council framework Decision on combating the sexual 
exploitation of children and child pornography 
(2004/68/JHA).  
Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 
Recommendation R (91) 11 concerning sexual 
exploitation, pornography and prostitution of, and 
trafficking in, children and young adults 
Recommendation (2001) 16, on protection of children 
from sexual exploitation 
Convention on Cybercrime of 23 November 2001 
Lanzarote Convention of 2007 
 
 
2.2. Conflicts of rights 
 
The system for detecting child pornography under 
development, which is briefly described in the following 
section, is designed to safeguard the rights of minors. 
However, this must be achieved without infringing upon 
the rights of Internet users. In the event of a conflict 
between these rights, the jurisprudence of the courts to 
date must be observed.  
We shall now address some of the conflicts of rights 
that will appear throughout the investigation. 
 
2.2.1. Secrecy of communications – minor rights 
 
In article 18.3, the Spanish constitution enshrines the 
right of secrecy in communications; article 8.2 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 and Convention 185 
of the Council of Europe on Cybercrime – which is a 
domestic Spanish law – clearly define secrecy of 
communications, including “any computer  data related to 
communication that indicate the origin, destination, route, 
time, date, size and duration of the communication or the 
type of underlying service.” This also includes any 
subscriber data in the possession of the service provider: 
data on traffic, content, communication type, identity, 
physical address, billing, payment, the location of 
communication equipment, time of service and other 
aspects. The European Court of Human Rights has held 
that approval of an intervention requires sufficient 
certainty and foreseeableness that the intervention will be 
successful in proving a specific crime (Malone case, 2 
August 1984), criticizing lack of specificity in the cause 
for intervention and the lack of evidence of criminal 
conduct as elements intrinsic to abuse and arbitrariness by 
public authorities. 
This must be taken into account when considering the 
use of the technology analyzed herein. 
 
2.2.2. Data protection – minor rights 
 
A number of recent rulings of the Spanish Supreme 
Court (Sentences 292/2008 of 28 May, 279/2008 of 29 
October, 873/2009 of 23 July, 795/2009 of 28 May) have 
held that the localization of IP addresses of computers 
used to commit crimes against art. 189 of the Penal Code 
is lawful and does not violate the secrecy of 
communications. Among other reasons, because IP 
addresses are easily localizable for any person, as they are 
in the public domain.  
However, with regard to protection of privacy and 
personal data, identification of the owner of a given 
telephone terminal or user of Internet can be obtained 
legally only on the basis of consent or a court order. In 
this regard, it must be recalled that law 25/2007 of 18 
October on the preservation of data on electronic 
communications is a huge step forward in achieving 
authorization of these provisions of data to the state 
security services.  
Here, the technology being developed will adhere to 
these legal standards, so that any identification of users of 
P2P networks shall be done following issuance of the 
required court order.  
 
2.2.3. Freedom of speech – minor rights 
 
This freedom also has limits. Thus, article 20.4 of the 
Constitution sets forth some of these, such as the right to 
honor, privacy, own image and the protection of children 
and young adults [6]. The latter point is highly germane to 
the issue addressed herein, and it mandates protection of 
minors. The Spanish Constitutional Court, in its sentence 
66/82, reminds us of this and aligns itself with the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms.  
On the basis of the above, pedophiles may seek to 
claim their right to freedom of speech, but this freedom 
can never be used against the dignity of minors, as in the 
distribution of child pornography.  
 
2.3. Legal challenges 
 
With respect to legal implications, major difficulties 
exist in determining liability, as different operators are 
involved in the communications chain, such as the 
telecommunications operator, the Internet service 
provider, the service provider, etc. Spanish law, such as 
the Law on Information Society Services, establish the 
principle of exempting services providers until they are 
actually cognizant of the unlawful nature of the content 
[7].  
These difficulties mount when links in the chain are 
located in different countries. This is the second 
challenge: legal jurisdiction. Although the rule of thumb 
in penal matters is to apply the law of the place of 
commission of an offence, the jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court clearly opts for ubiquity. At first, it 
accepted the theory of results, but it has slowly moved in 
the direction of ubiquity. This is clear in ruling 3.2.97, 
when it states that “…the facts must be considered to have 
been committed in all places in which the action has 
occurred and in places where results have arisen …” 
Without a doubt, this is the only theory that enables 
prosecution of cybercrime with a certain level of 
assurance. 
 
3. System Architecture 
 
The architecture of a system must reflect the needs of 
users and meet their expectations. Thus, a first level of 
abstraction is defined that provides both the functional 
blocks comprising the system and the relationship 
between these blocks and users. Cooperation among all 
functional units in accordance with previously established 
rules and restrictions gives rise to the ultimate 
functionality of the system. 
As part of the diagram for a high-level architecture, 
users can be considered an ordinary functional 
component. Thus, and due to the intelligence and 
flexibility of trained users, users often have total control 
of the architecture of the system and are even assigned a 
part of the functionality the system is designed to 
implement. This means that the proper use of the system 
largely depends on how users make appropriate use of it. 
 
This user-attributed capacity to control systems is 
welcome in many contexts, as the user becomes an 
intelligent supervisor. However, applications in which 
citizens’ secrecy of communications must be ensured, 
administrators’ capacity for total control can become a 
threat.  
Therefore, this paper will now propose a high-level 
architecture in a multi-protocol system for searching for 
pedophilic content. The proposed system safeguards user 
rights to secrecy of communications until an authority 
with the necessary powers legally allows an invasion of 
the privacy of suspect users following an analysis of the 
digital evidence provided. 
 
 
 
The design of the application is oriented towards 
safeguarding the rights of users that are under 
investigation (potentially, any user in a targeted network). 
As shown in figure 1, the system is composed of several 
functional elements and several steps are required to 
conclude an investigation. To describe the architecture, a 
summary explanation will be provided of the steps 
enumerated in the figure. 
 
1. Preparation of the search. A system operator 
communicates with the search pattern generator to 
prepare the search to be performed. The system 
searches for resources – i.e., files in different 
formats – that have previously been classified as 
pedophilic. The operator can select what 
resources, or files to include in the search – it 
would not be feasible to include all possible 
resources – the networks in which the search will 
be performed (for example, in the Ares, 
BitTorrent, eDonkey networks, etc.), the minimum 
number of matches for just one user, etc. The 
search pattern generator also generates evidence in 
a protected format (better if read only) to allow for 
subsequent editing. This will ensure that the 
system is used only for its initial purpose: to 
search for pedophilic material online. 
 
Figure 1. General Architecture 
2. Once the search has been configured and recorded 
for subsequent analysis, it is sent to the search 
engine. The search engine connects to each of the 
networks and searches for the content configured. 
The search engine is designed to allow for a 
proper distribution of the load in different 
machines, running the process in phases and other 
functionalities not discussed herein, as they are 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
3. As the search engine finds occurrences, it stores 
them in an evidence warehouse. An occurrence is 
the localization of a user that possesses a certain 
number of resources of pedophilic content. The 
configuration of the search engine (phase 1) 
contains a number of coincidence thresholds that 
will add a user to the evidence warehouse and the 
type of information to be stored on a user who 
possesses pedophilic content. 
4. When the search process is complete, other system 
operators can make a query to ascertain if there are 
other users that store content that is potentially 
pedophilic, according to the criteria established in 
the search. These operators have access to the 
general parameters of the users, indicating the 
number of resources with pedophilic content in 
their possession, but not information that can 
uniquely identify them. If identification of users is 
seen as necessary to pursue the investigation, 
authorization from the relevant authorities must be 
requested, presumably the judge in charge of the 
investigation. Until this authorization is granted, 
the system must not allow any operators to gain 
access to this data, regardless of the operator’s 
role. To attain this objective, information on users 
found must be protected even from system 
administrators themselves (this role has the 
greatest level of control over the system). Thus a 
mechanism based on robust cryptography has been 
designed that enables this protection. The 
implementation of this mechanism is one of the 
principal challenges of this work. 
5. Upon receiving a request from an appropriate 
operator, the system summarizes the evidence 
obtained from a set of users and requests 
authorization from the proper authorities, namely 
the judicial system. The system must provide these 
entities with the pertinent tools in order to execute 
this process in a manner that is efficient and that 
guarantees due process. Further, the system stores 
proof of all requests and concessions of 
authorizations made so as to allow for subsequent 
analysis, if necessary. 
 
6. Finally, and upon reception of the necessary 
authorization, the system discloses information on 
users who are in the possession of pedophilic 
content. First, it accesses the Internet services 
providers and requests information needed to 
identify the citizens under investigation. After 
gathering this information, the system provides 
access to the information to uses with sufficient 
authority. The entire process is recorded for any 
subsequent auditing. 
 
3.1. Technology challenges 
 
Technologically, the proposed architecture poses 
challenges that must be overcome in order to meet the 
requirements of the system. These are the most important 
ones in terms of user guarantees. 
 
- System audit. One of the foundations of the 
guarantees offered by the system is its capacity to 
be audited by third parties. Any accredited 
organization may audit the use of the system.  
Making the system sufficiently self-descriptive, 
inalterable and unable to disclose sensitive 
information either on users or the operations of 
police officials working on investigations is an 
objective that will be difficult to achieve. The sub-
system is being defined by a multi-disciplinary 
team that is taking account not only of purely 
technological aspects, but also political and legal 
ones. 
- Use of formats protected from manipulation. Most 
present-day storage systems can be manipulated 
with certain tools. Although some are designed to 
prevent manipulation, they are not usually capable 
of storing large amounts of information. Creating 
storage systems that meet these two conditions – 
high capacity and resistant to illicit manipulation – 
is another of the challenges system developers will 
have to face. 
- Reversible anonymization of evidence stored. 
Reversible anonymization of information has been 
dealt with in previous research papers in which the 
authors of this paper [8]. In this system, the 
specific problem has been studied of anonymizing 
information stored centrally – with total control of 
hardware and software by one of the actors in the 
process – and enabling the theoretically multiple 
authorizing entities to break that anonymity. 
- Creation of viable systems of interaction for 
managing authorizations. Authorization entities 
are the foundation for safeguarding users’ rights 
with respect to the secrecy of communications. 
Only these entities, on the basis of evidence that is 
proper in both form and content, can decide 
whether to disclose the identity of a user to the 
agents involved. Designing a system that will 
enable them to efficiently perform this task in 
terms of usability without infringing on the due 
process rights required throughout the process is 
another of the challenges faced. 
 
4. Discussion 
As mentioned in section 2, which describes the social and 
legal context, there are conflicts of rights in the structure 
and methodology of persecuting child pornography that 
must be taken into account. These conflicts can be 
summarized as follows:  
 
1. Conflict between the duty to persecute the 
criminal offence of producing, storing and 
distributing child pornography and the citizens’ 
right to secrecy in their communications. 
2. Conflict between the right to honor and the 
image of children and young people and the right 
of freedom of speech. 
3. Conflict over the jurisdiction for criminal 
offences committed in different legal regions.  
 
The system presented herein adequately manages the 
first of these conflicts. Under Spanish law, proper 
resolution of the conflict demands requires the 
involvement of the courts and network access providers 
on the basis of the proper terms and time frames.  
This collaboration exists at present, but it is not 
managed in a comprehensive manner by a single system 
working as an interface between the different entities 
involved. Instead, each of the entities possesses 
information to which it is not entitled under the law on 
users suspected of handling content with child 
pornography.  
This architecture has been designed following a study 
of the methodology used by institutions responsible for 
persecuting this type of criminal offence in Spain. The 
architecture fulfills two principles that are fundamental for 
resolving the conflict: 
 
1. The tool can be used only for the detection of 
pedophilic content. 
2. Information identifying users will remain 
anonymous until authorization has been received 
from a judicial authority. 
The first principle is provided by the recording in a 
non-manipulable form of the search to be performed and 
the possibility of external audits. Thus, the search cannot 
include content not related to the handling of child 
pornography resources, as this would be detected. 
 
The second principle is resolved by cryptography-
based solutions that can keep information anonymous 
until the proper conditions have been met. Information on 
the user can be retrieved from the network itself in which 
the occurrence arose or by accessing the information 
stored in the network access provider once necessary 
authorization has been received.  
Further, a judge may make a summary of the evidence 
found and grant authorization at his or her own discretion. 
Both reception of the authorization request with the 
attached evidence and the granting or denial of 
authorization shall be recorded in a form that is auditable 
by third parties, also including all security mechanisms 
needed for the process to uphold the due process rights 
and obligations of all involved parties. One traditional 
challenge in this type of system, which involves different 
participants with different technological capabilities and 
major security requirements, is system usability. For the 
system to be accepted by all the actors involved, security 
mechanisms must implemented that not only support the 
safeguards and obligations mentioned above, but also 
manage the trust of all actors in their transactions. To 
reinforce the usability of a system like the one proposed 
herein, with so many security requirements, personal 
cryptographic devices will be used, such as smart cards, 
cryptographic tokens and so on. In terms of usability, the 
effectiveness of these devices seems to have been proven 
for a broad spectrum of the public, as shown by the 
massive implementation by some states – such as Spain – 
of mandatory identification documents for citizens [9]. 
Police access to the databases of Spanish network 
access providers is not automated at present. The project 
of which the system described herein forms a part is also 
working to determine what type of information access 
providers must make available and under what conditions, 
so as to allow an investigation to move forward without 
infringing on the rights of the users of their services. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The exchange and commercialization of content with 
child pornography through the Internet has increased 
recently with the use of P2P networks. Significant alarm 
has been generated in society and a broad social 
consensus exists favoring their elimination from the 
Internet and the punishment of individuals committing 
these criminal offences. 
The use of automated computer and telematic tools 
capable of operating day and night on different computers 
is a major step forward in searching for and eliminating 
pedophilic content on the Internet, if compared to the 
limited actions of which a single human being is capable 
when operating alone. 
 
It is both technologically feasible and socially 
imperative for such tools to respect the civic rights of 
persons being investigated, and to not be used to set up 
processes of surveillance and attacks on the privacy of the 
overwhelming majority of users of P2P networks who 
exchange lawful information. Therefore, the automatic 
tool must be fitted with mechanisms ensuring that certain 
technical actions can be performed only if it has been 
authorized by the proper judicial entities. The design of 
the automated system presented in this paper meets these 
conditions and is an effective tool in detecting pedophilic 
content. 
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